



Is an independent judiciary consistent with a commitment to popular
sovereignty? Can a body dedicated to enforcing the principles of a written
constitution honor the will of the people? These questions have haunted
American constitutional scholars since the founding of the nation, and yet they
remain unresolved. Judicial review is an established institution, but its
legitimacy is still intensely debated.
The year 1989 marked the beginning of a new epoch in world history.
The Soviet empire collapsed, and then the Soviet Union itself disintegrated.
A number of new nations emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and in
Central Asia, and soon pledged their allegiance to democracy and constitution-
alism. They now find themselves confronting the very same question that has
troubled Americans for so many years: how to reconcile the power of judicial
review with the prerogatives of the demos. As these new nations try to give
specific content to the ideal of a constitutional democracy, they will both
advance and stumble, in much the same way we have. Yet there are certain
aspects of their situation that give their encounter with this ideal an extra
measure of urgency and difficulty.
First, there is uncertainty in many of these countries as to whether or not
a constitution exists in any but the most formal sense. For example, Russia
established a constitutional court at a time when it arguably had no constitu-
tion to enforce.' Forged in the Brezhnev era, with over three hundred
amendments, the so-called "constitution" was internally contradictory and
more a crazy quilt ordinance than a charter of governance.2 In Hungary, the
Constitutional Court has had to work with the scantiest of documents: a
statement of fundamental principles adopted by the legislature in the waning
days of the old regime. In such settings, judges are acutely aware that they are
making, not simply interpreting, a constitution.
Second, the judiciaries of these new nations have very little institutional
capital. The U.S. Supreme Court confronts doubts as to the legitimacy of
judicial review on an ongoing basis, but does so in a comforting context: the
Court has a long and noble history and knows that it has a secure place in
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both the structure of American government and the minds of the American
citizenry. In the new democracies of the East, however, the judiciary cannot
take its authority for granted. Not only must it fashion a constitution, it often
must give life and force to the idea of a constitutional court. Judges on these
courts must convince their fellow citizens that law is distinct from politics,
and that they are entitled to decide what that law is. Often, as has been the
case in Russia, efforts to build respect for the law and for the courts are
hindered by painful remembrances of how law was used as an instrument of
the ruling party. Many of those who are now judges obtained their position
because of their success as power brokers and cannot resist the temptation to
continue in that role.'
Among the many challenges that the new constitutional courts face is that
of managing the transition itself. They must construct constitutional principles
that span a historical divide. In America, the most stable of all democracies,
the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution against a backdrop of continu-
ous governmental structure, which allows it to formulate principles having a
tacit timeless quality. In contrast, the constitutional courts of Eastern and
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union must decide whether certain
general principles of constitutional law should restrain the new regime from
using its power to deal with the injustices of the past. Should, for example,
the new regime be able to prosecute the old regime or those who served it?
Most American constitutional lawyers would be offended by such prosecu-
tions, as they inflict punishment upon individuals for actions that, when
committed, were lawful or subject to less severe punishment. But, in the
papers that follow, Justice S61yom and Professor Teitel consider whether such
a general aversion to retroactive laws is appropriate in situations where the
government has undergone a radical regime shift.
These special features of constitutionalism in the post-Cold War era -
uncertainty, in some cases, about whether the document being construed as
a constitution can be distinguished from a repeatedly amended statute; the
paucity of respect for courts of law in general; and the difficulties of applying
general legal principles to governments that have undergone radical ideolo-
gical and political transformations - counsel against advancing the American
constitutional experience as a prototype for all to follow. At most, those
struggling with the dilemmas of constitutional democracy for the first time can
use the American experience as a resource - a living library to be consulted
for whatever pertinent knowledge it may contain. Meanwhile, Americans
should recognize that, because of the developments of 1989 and the disintegra-
tion of Soviet totalitarianism, now, more than ever, constitutional democracy
has a global dimension, and that we thus have new resources for enriching our
own appreciation of this ideal. The experience of these recently transformed
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nations may enhance our understanding of the legitimacy of judicial review
and throw new light on questions that still plague us some two hundred years
after the creation of our constitution. The best of all comparative exercises are
reciprocal.

